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Claude A. Buss 
Conflicts of Interest in East Asia and the Pacific: 
The United States and China 
This Report is the first of three resulting from the studies of our 
graduate seminars in National Security Affairs at the Naval Post Graduate 
School. The second will be entitled Conflicts of Interest in Northeast Asia 
and the third will cover Conflicts of Interest in Southeast Asia. Successive 
classes of officers of the Navy, the Army, the Air Force and the Marine Corps 
have contributed immeasurably to these Reports by their research, their 
theses, their papers and their class discussions. 
The inspiration for these Reports began with a Conference on Conflicts 
in the Pacific Basin which was hosted in 1985 by the Hoover Institution. I 
edited the Conference report. Then came the spectacular ending of the Cold 
War and it bacame evident immediately that a new approach to "Conflicts" 
was mandatory. My seminar was the logical place for a brand new series of 
analyses. I geared my students to this collegial effort and I tailored my own 
research toward these Reports . 
I undertook numerous research trips to Washington, to CINCPAC in 
Hawaii, and to Asia in preparation for this particular Report. I attended 
conferences in Australia and Korea; I made trips as American specialist for 
U.S.I.A. in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Japan; and I made two 
extended study trips to China. It is our hope that these Reports will be useful 
to our operators in the field and will make a contribution to the formulation 










Conflicts of Interest in East Asia and the Pacific: 
The United States and China 
In light of the feeling that Conflicts of Interest in the East Asia-Pacific Region 
stem primarily from frictions between the United States and China, this 
Report examines: 
I. The Domestic Situation in China 
II. 
III . 
China's Place in the World 
China' s Views of the United States 
IV. American Interests and Policies Affecting China 
V. Current U.S - China Issues 
VI. Suggestions for Improving U.S. - China Relations 
In considering new U.S. policies toward China, it is imperative to 
recognize the changes that have taken place in the domestic situation in 
China since the launching of Deng Xiaoping's modernization program. 
Pragmatism has replaced orthodox communism. The current regime is 
committed to economic -- but not political -- reform. The first of its cardinal 
principles is the continued rule by the Communist Party. The military is still 
in command. A succession struggle is likely to follow after the death of Deng 
but neither a breakup of China nor a reverse course in national development 
seems imminent. 
As for China' s Place in the world, China is strong. Militarily and 
economically, China merits respect as a leading power in regional and global 










diplomacy is rooted in the Charter of the U.N. and the Five Principles of 
Coexistence. Underlying all the issues between China and the rest of the 
world is the fundamental reality that its ultimate interest is in "peace and 
stability" which are essential to the accomplishment of its modernization 
program. 
China's view of the United States is that the United States is still the 
cold warrior, dedicated to the overthrow of the present regime in China 
which is still regarded as Communist. China cannot accept the American 
view of a New World which presumes continuation of American leadership 
and the perpetuation of the American value system. China's views must be 
adequately considered in shaping the future. Admittedly, the United States is 
still the world's only superpower but its relative strength and influence are 
declining. On the other hand, China is growing. China would very much 
like to be included again in the category of American "friends", if only the 
United States would discard the shibboleths of the Cold War. 
Turning to the American side of the U.S. - China relationship, it is 
recognized that the interests of the United States in China have always been 
grounded in security, commerce and the missionary endeavor (human 
rights). American actions in protecting those interests have depended on the 
power potential of the United States, the environment in which policies 
must be executed, and upon the domestic forces shaping American opinion. 
After the rupture of relations with China in 1950, American sentiment was 
nearly unanimous that, as a member of the international communist 
conspiracy, China should be treated as the Number 1 enemy in Asia. Only 
after the Nixon visit to China were American interests reappraised. President 










cooperate with China in its movement towards a market-oriented economy . 
Unfortunately the sanctions imposed after the events at Tienanmen left the 
Clinton administration with a heritage of bitterness and distrust toward 
China . 
This prevailing atmosphere of suspicion and distrust clouds 
negotiations on the current issues of security, trade (jobs) and human rights. 
The strongest conditioning factors of American policy are still the power 
potential of the United States, the existing environment in East Asia and the 
Pacific, and conflicts of opinion among American policy makers. In 
conducting relations with China, President Clinton is hampered by the 
concentration on the economy and the serious problems of the Middle East, 
Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti. China is far down on the Clinton list of priorities. 
Under the heading of security, the United States and China are at issue 
over the possible violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Missiles 
Technology Control Regulations. Our two nations need to get together on 
such regional conflicts as nuclear development in North Korea, peace 
keeping in Cambodia, and threats of aggression in territorial waters (especially 
in Senkaku and the islands of the South China Sea). 
The United States maintains its historical interest in Tibet, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan, all of which are considered by China to be domestic issues. 
China resolutely rejects any American effort to make human rights a subject 
of international relations. The decoupling in 1994 of the long standing 
linkage of Most Favored Nation and human rights, as well as the first visit of 
a high-level military (naval) delegation to the United States since 










include: reemphasize our common interest in economic prosperity and 
peace; reduce our rhetoric and lower the decibels of our arguments; get our 
domestic interest groups together before announcing a national stance toward 
diplomatic issues; consider more multilateralism in our negotiating 
processes; seek more effective means to advance our global agenda in an 
Asian context; pay more attention to style and to Chinese sensitivities; 
respond to the changing realities in China's domestic situation; discard the 
old division of the East Asia-Pacific region into "friends and allies" and 
others; be ready to reconsider the anachronistic Dulles Collective Security 
system if called upon to do so; and finally, get China fully and equally 
involved in the quest for stability, progress, and peace in the East Asia-Pacific 
region . 
• 





I. Domestic Factors in China's Foreign Policy 
II. China's Place in the World 
• 
Ill. The United States in China's Perspective 
IV. U.S. Interests in China 
V. Issues in U.S.-China Relations 
• 















CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 
The vision of a positive Pacific Community articulated by President 
Clinton at the APEC summit meeting in Seattle in the Spring of 1994 has been 
blurred by a plethora of problems which Asians perceive as caused by hostile 
unilateral U.S. actions. Frictions have arisen throughout the region due to 
American attempts to interject workers' rights issues into the World Trade 
Organization; and sanctions on China because of the Missiles Technology 
Control Regulations (MTCR), on Thailand over workers in Libya, and on 
Taiwan regarding endangered species. We have decertified Laos on narcotics; 
we continue to press Malaysia and Indonesia on workers' rights; and we have 
protested to Singapore on its flogging sentence against an American teenager. 
We disagree with almost all Asians about the proper tactics for promoting 
reform in Burma. In varying degrees, our promotion of human rights and 
democracy complicates our ties with several Asian nations. No wonder a 
sense of resentment and apprehension threatens to erode the sense of 
optimism and partnership forged in Seattle.l 
To be aware of problems is to take the first step toward their solution. 
Our difficulty lies in the gap which exists between what we want and what we 
know how to achieve. We are still the strongest power in East Asia with our 
incomparable market and our incredible supply of capital and technical 
know-how. A continued American military presence in East Asia and the 
Western Pacific is universally desired and we have a fifty year legacy of good 
1 This statement of "core challenges to U.S. policy makers" is taken from an in-house 
State Department memorandum which became available to the press and the public. The text 










and dwindling resources that we can commit to the region. As stated in the 
State Department memorandum, "we must weigh the impact of pursuing 
specific short term goals on our overall long term interests in .. .. tapping Asia's 
huge economic potential and unshaping a sense of community that will 
anchor us in the region and foster peace and prosperity''. 
This much is clear. Wherever one travels from Vladivostok to 
Singapore, he becomes increasingly conscious of misunderstandings inherent 
in the relationship between the United States and China. History and 
geography have combined to make China the dominant state in East Asia 
while economic and military power have made the United States an equally 
important factor in shaping the future of that part of the world. This Report 
is a study of the United States and China, based as it is on the belief that 
cooperation between these two great powers is essential for regional peace, 
stability and development. 
The ascendance of Mao Zedong to power in Beijing in 1949 and the 
conclusion of the Sino-Soviet alliance the following year determined the 
course of the American-Chinese relationship for the next four decades. 
During that time, the communist element in every local conflict threatened 
to spark a total, global war. The overriding concern of every American policy-
maker had to be to deter world-wide confrontation or to win or at least to 
survive should deterrence fail. A new day dawned with the demolition of 
the Berlin wall. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Warsaw Pact 
brought the European phase of the Cold War to an end. The delinkage of 
China from the perception of a world wide communist monolith has made it 










both the United States and China have been given an unprecedented 
opportunity to reexamine their conflicts of policy and to reassess their 
common interests. Relieved of the constraints of the Cold War, they can 
rearrange their priorities. Without neglecting the imperatives of national 
security, they can shift more of their energies and resources from ideological 
antagonism and military preparedness to economic cooperation and political 
understanding. Neither side can down play its global and regional 
responsibilities, nor renege on its obligations to allies and friends, but both 
the United States and China have so much power and prestige that common 
sense compels them together to seek a more harmonious coexistence . 
In the years that have passed since Tienanmen, Americans and 
Chinese have made sincere but sporadic efforts to improve their relationship. 
Old antagonisms die hard. Too often each side has disregarded the point of 
view of his adversary while strenuously arguing his own. Since each side has 
seemed to be talking past the other, a careful review of the past may bring to 
light steps that might be taken toward better understanding . 
This Report begins with a study of China' s political situation with 
special attention to the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. The 
next section analyzes China's perception of its place in the world followed by 
an analysis of China's views of the United States. Turning to view points of 
the United States, the Report then examines American interests in China and 
appraises the factors that have gone into the definition and implementation 
of those interests. The final section analyzes the issues that cloud the current 










Domestic Factors in China's Foreign Policy 
The current Chinese leadership sees its politics as stable, its domestic 
condition as tranquil, its economy as developing, and its security getting 
better every day. With the Party in solid control of the Government, and the 
people happier with the rising standard of living, no immediate threat of 
counter revolution appears on the horizon. The communist ideology of the 
last half century has given way to the thought of Deng Xiaoping. 
The current ideological line is essentially Deng Xiaoping Pragmatism--
"if it works, do it", or "if it catches mice, what difference does it make if the cat 
is black or white". Based on "Learning Truth from Facts" and "Practice" (the 
favorite themes of Deng Xiaoping), emphasis is placed on the "Four Cardinal 
Principles", "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" and "One Center, Two 
Basic Points". 
The admonitions of the "Four Cardinal Principles" are easy to 
understand. These Principles are: 1) we must follow the Socialist Road; 2) we 
must preserve the Peoples Democratic Dictatorship; 3) we must follow the 
leadership of the Communist Party; and 4) we must honor the thought of 
Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong. The Chinese are very selective in the respect 
they pay to Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong. It is now the thought of Deng 
Xiaoping that counts, and he has been known to say "we must get rid of the 
ossified thoughts of Marxism" and "perhaps Mao might have been 60% right 
in what he wrote". The message of the Four Cardinal Principles is simply, 
come hell or high water, the continued monopoly of the Communist Party 










to a great deal of what Dean Acheson once called "fancy dancing with words" . 
It is very difficult to find very much of orthodox socialism, let alone 
communism, in the exposition of the Chinese phrase. It is equally difficult to 
see where "Socialism, Chinese style", contains much of a threat to American 
democracy or its free enterprise system. 
Jiang Zemin, at the 14th Party Congress in November 1992 gave a 
lengthy explanation of "Socialism, with Chinese characteristic", Jiang said, 
'We must modify the best of socialist planning with the requirements of a 
free-market economy; we must keep public ownership but get the 
government out of operations; we must not worry about egalitarianism, each 
locality must give full play to its own strength in regional development". 
This certainly gave official blessing to some of the cherished tenets of free 
enterprise and lends substance to the popular slogan, "to get rich is glorious" . 
Further details about the Socialist Road show how far contemporary 
China has departed from earlier Chinese Communist experience. Continuing 
the testimony of Jiang Zemin: "Let us seek foreign funds, resources, 
technology and managerial experience; let us expedite scientific and technical 
progress; let us develop education and give full rein to the intellectuals". 
Deng was quoted as saying, "we must not worry about labels, if we find 
shareholding or stock markets are beneficial, let us use them although they 
are capita lis tic" . 
In summation, Jiang has contended that "Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics" is "anything that is favorable to developing the productive 
forces in socialist society, favorable to increasing the comprehensive national 
strength of the socialist country, and favorable to enhancing the people's 











The last of the catch phrases is "One Center, Two Basic Points". The 
one Center is that China must modernize as fast as possible. "Our central task 
is to reform, to build China into a prosperous, powerful, democratic, civilized 
and modern socialist country". The two basic points are "economic reform 
full speed ahead" and "open up to the outside world". There must be no 
deviation either from the right or the left. The danger from the right is from 
those who seek political reform (democracy) too fast like the 
counterrevolutionaries of Tienanmen. The danger from the left is from 
those like Mao Zedong who advocate perpetual class struggle and resist 
reform. Everyone accepts the necessity of continuing reform, the only 
arguments are over pace and degree. 
In the last sixteen years with Deng Xiaoping at the helm, China has 
pursued the "one center" --modernization-- with consistency and success. 
The support of "the first basic point" -- opening up to the outside world -- on 
the other hand is not quite so unanimous. Some remnants of the 
gerontocracy object to the bright colored dresses, the love of dancing and 
craving for material things displayed by the younger generation. They see 
high living, gambling, corruption, drugs and prostitution as the inevitable 
consequences of ''bourgeois liberalism". They lament that "flies and 
mosquitoes come in when the windows are open". Some of the 
conservatives have launched campaigns to curb "spiritual pollution" or to 
oppose the "peaceful evolution" of capitalism, but they have not dared to go 
so far as to advocate the closing of the open door. 
With respect to the "second basic point" -- reform -- the Chinese 










interests so diverse and poverty so prevalent that the problems dwarf the 
accomplishments. Reform of all kinds -- political, economic and social-- is 
universally desired but the Chinese must make haste slowly. They cannot 
risk making the mistakes so obvious in the former Soviet Union. The 
creative energies of the people must be liberated, their level of living must be 
improved, but the party's grip on power must be continued and the unity of 
the nation must be preserved . 
The party leaders have good reason to be concerned about their 
legitimacy. Periodic popular movements, culminating in the nationwide 
incidents at the time of Tienanmen, give some indication of extensive 
discontent. Force is still the ultimate guarantee of law and order. As the 
older generation of leaders pass from the scene, too much power trickles 
down to the "princes", that is the children, relatives and favorites of the 
founding fathers. As in other communist societies, the cadres have become 
the new managerial class which struggles to hold on to their prerogatives. 
As prosperity comes to more and more of the country, the gap tends to 
narrow between the party leaders and the people. After all only 50 million 
people belong to the Party, more than a billion do not. As local economies 
have boomed, primarily in the Special Economic Zones, local cadres have 
obtained a great deal of autonomy. If successful in their enterprises, they are 
not inclined to pay too much attention to directives from Beijing. The Party 
nowadays listens more to the people than the people listen to the Party 
leaders. The prestige of the Party is increasingly open to challenge as 
everybody seems to be caught up in the excitement of making money. The 
oratorical barrage about the role model of Party leaders has little effect on 










reforming social situation. As the people earn more money, they want the 
freedom to spend it. Furthermore, they do not wish to be ordered around by 
cadres they no longer fear or respect. The cadres have been told that they 
must shape up or be shipped out. No more jobs for life, no more promise of 
the iron rice bowl and no more lording it over the common people. Still the 
Chinese cannot expect democracy to follow on the heels of prosperity because 
they have been warned that anything like the multi-party and parliamentary 
system of the west is entirely out of the question at the present time. 
The Chinese leadership seems solid as of now but its future is a matter 
of conjecture. Office holding is still a matter of persons rather then 
institutions, which means that individuals are important regardless of the 
slots they fill in the table of organization. In the Chinese system, the 
positions of power are in the highest organs of the Party (the Politburo), the 
government (the State Council), the China Peoples Political Consultative 
Committee (CPPCC), and the Military (the Central Military Commission). For 
two decades Deng, the master puppeteer, has matched personnel and 
positions to assure the continuation of his policies. 
The leadership now in place is the result of a long process of 
bargaining, negotiation, cajoling and compromise among the elder statesmen, 
headed by Deng Xiaoping. The body politic of the masses is in no way 
engaged in the process. The current elite, who hold all the appointive offices 
of the Party and the Government, is a melange of technocrats, bureaucrats, 
military officers, provincial administrators and Party leaders. Most have 
risen to the top on the basis of their own merit. They do not threaten the 
status quo in any significant way, nor do they hold out much of a promise of 










supremo like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping . 
The ultimate reservoir of political power is the 21-man Party Politburo, 
headed by a standing committee of seven. The duo at the very top is Party 
General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission Jiang 
Zemin. His counterpart in the government is Prime Minister Li Peng. The 
other members of the Standing Committee are Qiao Shi, the long-time head 
of the internal security apparatus; Li Ruihan, the chief ideological 
propagandist; Zhu Rongji, former mayor of Shanghai and head of the newly-
created super-economic ministry; Hu Jintao, the younger distinguished Party 
Secretary in Tibet; and Admiral Liu Huaqing, concurrent Deputy Chairman of 
the Central Military Commission. 
Looking to the future, there will be muted evidences of rivalry and 
intrigue within the leadership as long as Deng Xiaoping lives. As long as he 
lives, the best that can expected is for the collegial directorate to keep 
economic reforms on track as the country edges toward market economy and 
hopefully toward a more open society. Doubts cannot be avoided about the 
ability of any new leadership, however reformist and cohesive it appears to 
be, to quell any serious challenge to law and order without the possibility of 
resort to force. Therefore a disciplined, unified military is a prime necessity . 
China has not ceased to press forward with its program of military 
modernization. Particularly since the Gulf War, China has left internal civic 
action to the People's Armed Police and has concentrated on the 
professionalization -- the combat readiness-- of the armed forces. Perceiving 
the need for less manpower, and more high tech equipment, China has 
increased its annual military budget by 12% mostly for the Navy and the Air 










States, and $30 billion for Japan. On a per capita basis, China's military 
expenditures are among the lowest in the world. 
The new military command favors professional officers and soldiers 
over political commissars. Although Jiang Zemin is titular Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission, it is Deputy Chairman Admiral Liu Huaqing, 
who calls the shots. In the interest of internal security, on assumption of 
office he shifted 300 officers in their regional posts. In addition, he appointed 
his own men to be Chief of Staff, Department Heads in the Staff organization, 
Minister of Defense, and head of the National Defense University. With 
political and military establishments in place, the Party seems to be in the best 
possible condition to preserve its authority over the military and to keep a 
unified military in the service of the state. 
So far China has enjoyed the degree of political stability which has 
made possible its economic success story. In the last decade China has 
merited the same close attention usually paid to Japan or the four tigers --
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Being labeled as "Socialist" , 
China's economy is often treated with a certain disdain. Its progress, 
however, is as spectacular as its capitalistic neighbors. "Socialism, with 
Chinese characteristics" hides a robust national economy. The need for that 
economy to continue to grow makes China a strong advocate for stability and 
peace. The Chinese believe that they deserve from Americans the same 
respect shown to Japan in addressing the security problems of East Asia and 
the Pacific. 
When economic modernization got under way in 1980, China was near 
the bottom in its level of living. It is estimated that per capita income was 










agriculture produced 42% of the G.N.P., manufacturing 38% and services the 
remaining 20%. China was able to export about 4% of its G.N.P. amounting to 
less than US $10 billion. 
The contemporary rate of progress began in the agricultural sector. The 
communes were gradually replaced by a contract responsibility system on a 
household bases which meant that families were given more leeway to grow 
what they pleased and sell where they could get the best prices. Then a 
rationalization program for industries began, resulting in privatization of 
some state-owned and operated enterprises and in gradual progression 
toward a market economy. The Special Economic Zones were created, coastal 
enclaves opened to the outside world, and the policy adopted of seeking 
funds, resources, technology and managerial talent from abroad. 
The economy has boomed until today when China can be counted 
among the stronger nations of the world. Its total foreign trade approaches 
US $200 billion annually. In GNP the agricultural share has shrunk to 30%, 
manufacturing grown to 45% and the service sector to 25%. Agricultural 
output exceeds the local demand and industrial out put ranks China among 
the world's top 10. Its overall economic growth rate in the past three years 
has grown steadily in excess of 9 or 10%. In 1993 China attracted foreign 
investments of some US $25 billion with a substantial part coming from the 
United States. In that year China enjoyed a favorable trade balance of US $23 
billion with the United States. China maintained a foreign exchange reserve 
in the neighborhood of US $40 billion, far more than enough to meet its 
obligations. Its foreign debt service ratio was 8%, substantially lower than the 










problems. Huge increases in the money supply and failure of supply of goods 
to keep up with demand have caused steeply rising prices, dangerous 
inflation, wide spread corruption and a thriving black market. Some 
localities have made tons of money while others have lagged in growth . 
With thousands of retail outlets opening each year, many a commercial 
center takes on the look of a miniature section of Taipei or Hong Kong. Some 
200 million people have left the farms for the cities in search of wealth . 
Breaking the iron bowl has not been without its costs. Unemployment and 
underemployment are rampant, as can readily be seen by the redundancy of 
labor and the evidences of homelessness in the cities. So far the authorities 
have been able to keep the situation under control. 
Specifically, the eighth Five-Five-Plan (1990-1995) calls for upgrading of 
the agricultural and industrial infrastructure by such water conservancy 
works as the Three-Gorges dam on the Yangtze and by the construction of 
many transportation and communications, electronics, and energy-producing 
projects. In this period, the Chinese want the GNP to continue to grow at 
least 9% per year. They want to accelerate conversion of government 
functions (such as the military in domestic production and export trade) and 
gradually get the government out of business. They want the heavily 
subsidized state-operated enterprises to turn a profit or disappear. Most of all 
they want to develop administrative, legal and social security systems that 
will enable them to modify the best of socialist planning that they have with 
the prosperity that they want. 
In its quest for benefits "for the productive forces in a socialist society, 
the comprehensive national strength of the socialist country, and enhancing 










enterprises but is also aware of the dangers of unbridled competition. In its 
history, China has suffered 1) from a capitalism which it equates with 
exploitation and imperialism and 2) from communism which it identifies 
with loss of freedom and equality in misery. China sees in "Socialism, with 
Chinese characteristics", the combined advantages of central planning with 
local initiative, public ownership with private operation, social justice and 
common prosperity with the individual's right to be rich. As Zhu Rongji 
expressed it, "we adapt foreign management to the spirit of Chinese 
civilization and the cultural traditions of the Chinese nation". Its progress 
has been significant, but its problems enormous . 
It is essential for American policy makers to keep in mind this official 
Chinese estimate of their own domestic situation. They are convinced their 
country is on the right track and their leaders know what they are doing . 
They have their own philosophy of development and progress, grounded as 
it is in centuries of history. They are masters of their own house, and the 
leading power in their own region. They are entitled to what they conceive to 
be their rightful place in the world. 
II 
China's Place In The World 
As the Chinese have grown more conscious of their growing power, 
they have become more insistent upon the respect and the courtesies which 
they feel are their rightful due. In their litany they are a threat to no one, they 
will bow to no one's threat. Any tolerance of white racism or acceptance of 










in their exploitations by the West. 
In the face of the new international situation, China characterizes its 
foreign policy as "independent and peaceful". When it comes to issues 
involving national interests and state sovereignty, China insists it will never 
give in to outside pressure. China does not form alliances with any country 
or bloc of countries, nor will it join any military alliance. China is opposed to 
the arms race and stands for effective disarmament and arms control. China 
strictly observes the UN Charter and the publicly-acknowledged norms 
governing international relations. China has its own ideas about the kind of 
international order which is be established -- not an American-dominated 
coalition but "a peaceful, stable, just and rational new international order 
based on the five principles of coexistence. These are 1) mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) mutual 
noninterference in internal affairs, 4) mutual benefit on an equal footing, and 
5) peaceful coexistence". According to the Chinese, the people of every 
country - big and small, strong and weak, rich and poor alike -- should have 
the right to choose their own social system and path to national 
development. 
China is totally aware that the world today is undergoing a historic 
period of tremendous change. The bipolar pattern has ended, giving rise to 
all kinds of ethnic disturbances, territorial disagreements, religious disputes 
and bloody conflicts of competing nationalisms. In China's view, economic 
competition between the industrialized powers has intensified and the gap 
between South and North has widened. Hegemonism and power politics 











China looks forward to a decade of peace and stability in the region of 
East Asia and the Pacific, in spite of what it perceives to be some major 
destabilizing factors. According to China, these include American attempts to 
impose its own concepts of democracy and human rights on Asian peoples, 
the reawakening of Japanese expansive impulses, the chaos in the lands of 
the former Soviet Union, the nuclear developments in the Korean peninsula 
and the mounting uncertainties in Southeast Asia. China sees nothing 
threatening or hegemonistic in its own increasing military expenditures or its 
claims of sovereignty over the Spratly islands . 
For the Chinese, international relations are meant to serve domestic 
goals. Diplomatic problems must be solved in the light of basic principles (if 
at all possible), and foreign policies must be formulated to contribute to long-
range national objectives. As with any other nation, these objectives must 
include protection from foreign invasion, insurance of domestic tranquillity 
and a more perfect union, promotion of the general welfare and the securing 
of the blessings of their own value system for themselves and their posterity. 
They are hard-headed and unapologetic in the protection and promotion of 
their own national interests . 
China's first concern is naturally the security of its homeland. This 
means that, in its view, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan are internal matters to 
be dealt with without any interference whatever from any outside powers . 
Boundary disputes -- are exclusively bilateral affairs, of concern only to the 
' parties presently involved. Arguments over the limits of territorial waters 










from a foreign enemy . 
Looking in any of the four directions, China sees imminent threats 
over the horizon. The greatest danger lies in the north, where the interests of 
China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas converge. During the Cold War 
China played its Soviet card to counter the threat from the combination of the 
United States and Japan. Now its relations with Russia are conducted in a 
radically changed environment. No longer tied together by a common 
ideology, the two nations blow hot and cold in their attitudes toward one 
another. Modern Russia is not as fearsome as the former Soviet superpower. 
Russian territory east of the Urals is under developed, isolated from Moscow 
and neglected. Its peoples are a diverse melange of Turkic-Mongolian native 
inhabitants and Russian immigrants. They are torn between the ambitions of 
stifled nationalisms and the benefits of an imperial Russian new connection . 
On China's borders, the nuclear threat of the Soviet Union has practically 
disappeared. The former Soviet navy is in shambles and the army is in 
disarray . 
The transition from the Soviet Union to Russia has left the Chinese 
with a host of problems. The "stans" -- Kazakstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan--
as independent states are still dubious neighbors to China because of their 
ethnic, religious and ideological struggles. Besides, Kazakstan still has 
nuclear capability. The prospect of a new Russian empire is extremely 
unsettling. Neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin is viewed with any favor in 
China. Gorbachev is primarily regarded as a traitor to Communism and 
Yeltsin as the one who suppressed the abortive coup in Moscow in 1991. In 










China now sees Russia in Northeast Asia as a land for expanded trade, 
investment, and emigration and a source for modern weaponry at bargain 
prices. Economic arguments are bound to proliferate and border disputes will 
not go away. In China's view, everything can be settled by patient 
negotiation: nothing is worth the risk of war. 
China's relations with Japan are decidedly upbeat. Although 
sensitivities about Japan's past misdeeds in China cannot be denied, the 
Chinese have been assuaged by visits of high-ranking Japanese including the 
Emperor. The Chinese have been pleased by Japanese help in China's 
modernization program. An economically strong Japan is welcome in China 
for its investments, its aid and managerial talent, but an ultra-nationalistic 
independently-rearmed Japan is anathema. The value of trade between 
China and Japan reached US$ 39 billion in 1993, and as Vicepremier Zhu 
Jongji told Prime Minister Hosokawa, "there is no reason why it should not 
reach 10 times that much", Geographic nearness and cultural affinity are 
strong determinants in China's relations with Japan . 
The Chinese feel they have a better understanding of the Koreans than 
any other outsiders, particularly the Americans, could possibly have. Korean 
culture is rooted in that of China, and for centuries China was the suzerain 
over either a divided or unified Korea. Most Chinese and Koreans were 
unreservedly anti-Japanese during World War II. Subsequently, tens of 
thousands of Chinese lost their lives fighting alongside their Communist 
Korean allies against the U.S.-led forces of the United Nations during the 
Korean war. China and the Solviet Union formed separate treaties of alliance 
with North Korea which gradually lost their binding power as the three 










faith in the five principles of coexistence, China recognized the government 
of South Korea in 1993. China did not turn its back on its former ally, North 
Korea, nor did it shift its support in foreign policy totally to South Korea. 
China wants good relations with both Koreans. China says firmly that it will 
not meddle in the internal affairs of other states, so it will stay out of the 
Korean process of seeking unification. China also says it favors a non-nuclear 
Korean peninsula. Therefore it hailed the non-nuclear agreement between 
North and South Korea that was entered into in December, 1992. Above all, 
China wants peace-- not another war-- in Korea. As one Chinese diplomat 
phrased it, "No matter how stubborn the North Korean negotiators show 
themselves to be, endless arguments are far better that threats or use of force." 
Looking to the south, China' s first priority is to secure its land frontiers 
with Vietnam, Laos and Burma. As long as France and the United States 
were engaged in hostilities in Indochina, China feared that Vietnam was only 
a stepping stone for aggression against China. That fear vanished in the 
psychological aftermath of the Tet offensive. Immediately after Tet, Mao 
Zedong perceived the real danger to China on its southern border lay in a 
Soviet design to use Vietnam as a surrogate power in encircling China. In 
1979 Mao launched a pedagocial war-- that is to teach Vietnam a lesson. To 
his dismay, it was the Vietnamese who taught him a lesson. If China wanted 
secure borders, friendly neighbors, and expanded trade, China learned anew 
that it would be better to talk than to fight. It would be better to depend upon 
diplomats rather than soldiers, to listen rather than to lecture, to build roads 
rather than to send tanks, and to offer cooperation rather than to resort to 
aggression. These were the lessons that Mao bequeathed to Deng Xiaoping 










the Paracel and Spratly Island groups. China encountered no opposition in 
establishing its claim to the Paracels, but has run into opposition in the 
Spratlys. The location of the Spratlys astride vital lines of communication, 
and the prospect of discovery of substantial petroleum reserves make the 
Spratlys tempting targets. China, Vietnam, and the Philippines have taken 
steps to enforce their conflicting claims. In March 1992 China passed a law 
declaring the Nansha (the South China Sea) to be Chinese territorial waters 
and proclaimed its readiness to use force to back up its claims. China insists 
that these acts do not constitute hegemonism and should not be construed as 
a threat to anyone. China's neighbors disagree. China merely responds that it 
welcomes joint development of the resources of the Spratlys and stands ready 
to enter into bilateral discussions with any single power that has a specific 
counterclaim on any one of the islands in dispute . 
China is extremely solicitous about the welfare and good will of 
millions of ethnic Chinese who live and prosper everywhere in Southeast 
Asia. Followers of the Kuomintang in the heyday of Chinese nationalism, 
they were sharply divided as a group by the Chinese civil war. Thoroughly 
patriotic as expatriates usually are, the Overseas Chinese are capitalistic to the 
core. In the communist insurgencies that followed on the heels of liberation 
of Southeast Asia, the interests of the guerrillas were usually identified with 
those of the government in Beijing. Gradually things changed. Insurgencies 
were suppressed and Beijing became so engulfed in its domestic woes that it 
had little to expend in support of its former clients. China distanced itself 
from residual insurgents in Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines. 
Current relations with Overseas Chinese are important factors in 










allegiance to the country of their domicile rather than to their ancestral 
homeland. They have been told that if they have the feeling that they are 
being discriminated against, they should take their case to the courts or to the 
local authorities . 
China has taken giant strides in regularizing its relations with all the member 
states of ASEAN. Gone are the days when ASEAN was conceived as an 
instrument of the anti-Communist side in the Cold War. China has gone far 
to dispel the fears of the small, individual states that live in the shadow of the 
Chinese dragon, and has fallen in line with the steps taken by the ASEAN 
organization to promote regional security against China or any other possible 
external aggressor. China is a guest of the Post-Ministerial Conference of 
ASEAN and is a full participant in the Asian Regional forum. It seeks full 
membership in the commercial organizations and financial institutions of 
Southeast Asia and has been admitted as an observer to the non-aligned 
movement. China's officials are extremely active in exchange of visits and 
attendance at conferences. The Chinese are eager to identify themselves with 
what may be called regional or Asian points of view on such subjects as 
"democracy and human rights" . 
III 
The United States in China's Perspective 
It is within the framework of its regional concerns with security, that 
China must conduct its relations with the United States. In protecting and 
promoting its own interests, China is neither blinded to the heritage of its 










Chinese, but this is no longer true. Looking back over the suffering and 
humiliation in their recent history, the Chinese are inclined to look upon the 
United States less as. a particular friend and more as the worst enemy of the 
revolution. In reviewing the past, the Chinese see the roots of their modern 
ills in imperialist exploitation. The Chinese allege that although Americans 
were better than most imperialists-- possibly more lenient but certainly more 
self-righteous -- they were also guilty of disregard for the rights of China . 
Whatever bitterness against the U.S. simmered within the 
Communists before World War II burst into flames because of the role of the 
U.S. in China's civil war, (1945-1949). When Chiang lost, the Americans were 
also defeated. Following the Communist victory, Mao broke off relations 
with the United States and signed an alliance with Stalin. This was China's 
answer to the renewed American determination to make the world safe for 
democracy. The Cold War was on. When the Cold War gave way to 
hostilities in Korea and Vietnam, it was the Americans who were on the 
aggressive and the Chinese were fighting on the defensive. All this is the 
Chinese story. 
The Chinese invited Nixon to China in 1972, and restored normal 
diplomatic relations with the United States. They had no love for the United 
States during the Reagan administration, but generated high hopes that 
President Bush might eventually pursue more sympathetic policies. Bush 
had experienced life in China at first hand as an American ambassador. No 
less dedicated than Reagan to democracy and a free market economy, he was a 
more practical person than his predecessor. He was as friendly to China as the 
Chinese could reasonably expect. After Bush, they did not know what to 










certain amount of respect. As one Chinese writer noted, "he comes from 
Arkansas so he must be a skillful politician; a disciple of Fulbright, he must be 
steeped in international affairs; a Rhodes scholar, he must be intelligent; 
resisting the Vietnam war, he must be a man of compassion; and having 
visited Taiwan, he must be interested in mainland China". 
The Democratic platform on which Clinton was chosen to run gave 
precious little insight into what its nominee would do about China. It 
referred only to support for Chinese overseas and for a Radio Free Asia that 
would blanket China with broadcasts lauding the values of the Free World. 
The Chinese paid attention when Clinton said, "I am going to focus like a 
laser beam on the economy and foreign policy will come into play only as it 
affects the economy". That seemed to play down the importance of China. 
The Chinese chafed when Clinton accused Bush of coddling tyrants from 
Baghdad to Beijing. 
Immediately after election, Chinese spokesmen assumed an indulgent 
air. A Chinese State Councillor said, "Clinton will soften his views on China 
-- pre-election rhetoric is rarely indicative of future policy''. He added, "we 
are confident that a Democratic White House will not produce a sea change, 
but any bland optimism about Sino-U.S. relations is wishful thinking" . 
As of this time, mid-1994, a contrived coolness marks personal 
relations between Chinese and American officials, especially in Beijing. Very 
few conversations are initiated by the Chinese and meetings are extremely 
circumspect. The warmth of human relations is temporarily on hold, except 
of course as between genuine friends. 
The Chinese establishment, seeing itself as the last bastion of Marxism-










evil of Communism, China sees "peaceful evolution" and "U.S. interference 
in China's internal affairs' as merely the latest means for the United States to 
accomplish its objective. The American tendency to meddle and to preach is 
especially resented in matters of the Dalai Lama and the status of Taiwan . 
The sale of the F-16s was particularly irritating. 
In China's view, the United States does not yet act on the premise that 
the Cold War is over. The United States is accused of maintaining the 
mightiest military establishment in the world for protection against a threat 
that has disappeared. Further, the United States is all too quick to resort to its 
military might as shown in Grenada, Panama and the Gulf. The struggle for 
democracy so dear to Americans is irrelevant in China, because the Chinese 
have their own ideas about what constitutes good government. 
China's fundamental gripe against the United States is that the United 
States harbors delusions of grandeur about being the "leader" of the world. 
China, along with many others in Asia, has no intention of being catalogued 
as a mere follower of the United States. China has its own ideas about its 
place in any projected new world order. It claims for itself all the prerogatives 
that "the Americans arrogantly assume for themselves". 
The suspicion of the Chinese about American intentions is summed 
up in the charge that the United States is in process of working out a new 
regional strategy -- restructuring its armed forces, adjusting its force 
deployment, and reconsidering its strategic alliances -- all with the objective 
of continuing its role as the leader of the world. In the opinion of one writer: 
"The United States can possess nuclear forces 
sufficient to wipe out the world 10 times over, 










defense or even for peaceful purposes. The United 
States may become the world's biggest arms dealer, 
selling tens of billions of dollars worth of high 
technology weapons to the Middle East each year, 
but when other countries send a single shipload of 
munitions to the Middle East, the United States 
surveils the ship. If this is not power politics, what 
is it?"2 
It is generally believed that no matter the pretext the United States 
must ensure that no other superpower be permitted to compete with it 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. "Deterrence", the main pillar of 
U.S. strategy, is a term to let adversaries know in no uncertain manner that 
the United States possesses the capability to wage war on any scale, as well as 
the resolve to use its power. The United States is determined to be supreme 
in every aspect of military power-- nuclear, conventional and space. It 
intends likewise to remain unchallenged in comprehension and use of 
technology, military theory, command and control systems and intelligence 
support. To achieve these goals, the United States feels that it must maintain 
its military presence abroad, its forward deployment, its bases overseas, its 
prepositioning policies and its political-military diplomacy (military 
assistance, joint exercises and training, military visits and exchanges). No 
other nation has such policies, say the Chinese . 
According to the Chinese, there is a fatal weakness in this American 
strategy, primarily because the United States lacks the strength to fulfill its 










Americans. Economically, the United States is declining in its proportion of 
the world's strength. At the end of World War I, the GNP of the United 
States was 48% of the world's GNP; by 1990 it had fallen to 26%. Once the 
United States was the world's greatest creditor nation, now it is the world's 
greatest debtor. It has yet to find means to cope with its huge deficits and its 
negative balance of trade. In the Gulf War, the United States had to ask its 
allies to bear the major part of the costs, thus putting its own armed forces in 
the situation of "beggar police". 
Politically, the United States has not the skill or the means to cope with 
the challenges and obstacles which have surfaced in the complex post-cold 
war world. There is no need to list the disagreements which have arisen 
between Americans and Europeans in dealing with the succession states of 
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the Middle East. The United States, 
Europe and Japan are locked in battle over global and regional trading 
conditions. The problems of Africa defy the wisdom of all the advanced 
countries and the United Nations. United States strategy has also run into 
strong opposition from the far flung Third World. The countries of the Third 
World do not like imported "democracy'' and concepts of "human rights", 
and they want control of their own defense and national development . 
Militarily, the United States faces so many inconsistencies that it will 
simply have to give up its hegemonic ambitions. High technology weapons 
cost too much. Americans want their say in every part of the world, yet they 
want to reduce the size of their forces and the scale of their military 
expenditures. They want to control the centrifugal tendencies of their allies 
while insisting upon greater burden sharing. They expect allies to obey 










Nations. They will not entertain any proposals for arms control which would 
chip away at the American military dominance. 
One factor that must be borne in mind when analyzing China's views 
of the United States is that China is a totalitarian regime. Official statements, 
academic explanations and media presentations are totally regimented. Any 
leaks or variations from the official line could well cost a dissenter his job, his 
freedom, or his life. Any compilation of official views is by no means a look 
into the hearts and minds of the Chinese masses. Other than official views of 
the United States can only be found in sources outside of China. 
In spite of their criticism of the United States, the Chinese want to 
continue "constructive engagement". Recognizing their differences with 
Americans in world outlook, it now makes sense for the Chinese to cooperate 
where their interests converge and to compete on a friendly basis where their 
interests are in conflict. There is no need for bitterness, enmity or distrust, 
and furthermore the Chinese see clearly the material advantages of the 
American connection. The United States is an unrivaled source of technical 
know-how and it offers China the lucrative American market. China shares 
a common interest in preserving stability throughout East Asia and in 
contributing to global peace by cooperating in the United Nations. Together 
with the United States, China wants to prevent nuclear proliferation, to 
abolish chemical and biological weapons, to curb international drug traffic 
and to protect the global environment. As economic relations inevitably 
grow, so will economic conflicts, but it is in everybody's interest to keep 
disputes from growing into hostilities. There is every reason to hope that 
China and the United States will become friends again, say the Chinese, 










States. Chairman Jiang Zemin of the Chinese Communist Party told a 
visiting American Senator, 'We hope to have more members of Congress 
and people from other circles visiting China .. .. Through such visits they will 
gain first-hand knowledge of Chinese society and feel the Chinese peoples' 
deep friendship for the American people and see the tremendous potential 
for mutually beneficial cooperation". The Chinese, however, are staunchly 
loyal to their own value system and maintain unchallenged faith in their 
diplomatic correctness. Still they give every evidence that they are ready to 
negotiate their specific issues with the Americans as long as it can be done 
without jeopardizing their fundament long-term interests . 
IV 
U.S. Interests In China 
Like the Chinese, the Americans have the constraints of history as well 
as the realities of the current environment in East Asia that must be respected 
as the United States conducts its relations with China. 
The capabilities of the persons in the top jobs of the Cabinet, the 
Security Council, the various agencies or ambassadorial posts abroad are not 
the sole keys to success or lack thereof in the course of American diplomatic 
relations. As firm or consistent as a president may appear to be, he is at the 
mercy of changing circumstances far beyond his control. As distinguished, 
and as much at home in Asia as our representatives may be, they do not 
make judgments or carry out missions on their own individual competence. 
They are backed by the oft-maligned Washington establishment employing 
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conflict with the Congress. In addition, each Embassy overseas has its own 
country team composed primarily of career officers who are attuned to local 
customs, often speak the native language, and are thoroughly familiar with 
Embassy files. There is tremendous institutional strength in the Foreign 
Service and in the various area specialists if the persons at the top choose to 
use them. 
It must be recognized that the United States as a nation no longer 
enjoys the preponderance of power that it has possessed most of the time 
since World War II. The shrinkage in forward deployment of American 
forces, the increasing independence of American allies, and the weakened 
condition of the American economy have long ago dispelled any illusions of 
a Pax Americana. The United States is still the only superpower. It is by far 
the strongest single power and will stay that way for a long time to come. In 
Asia, the little tigers, Japan and China have grown substantially. With their 
new-found strength, they demand that their voices be heard. American 
diplomats can no longer pound the table and say, "this is the way it is going to 
be". The time has come when Americans in their own interest must shed the 
mantle of toughness, learn to listen more intently, and practice the art of 
compromise . 
In assessing their interests in China, Americans must consider the 
relevant concerns of China's neighbors. Likewise in dealing with China's 
neighbors, the interests of China must be respected. On China's borders in the 
north, the nuclear threat of the Soviet Union has been greatly diminished. 
The breakup of the Soviet Empire has left Russia and the smaller succession 
states with a host of new problems. What will happen to the mighty Russian 










Kazakstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan into Sinkiang? How will the United 
States be affected by expanding Chinese interest in the development of East 
Siberia's rich resources? All the problems of Northeast Asia invite 
multilateral conversation . 
Americans and Chinese will not be able to keep Japan and Korea out of 
their own negotiations. Both are vitally concerned with Japan's future 
military development and with the fate of the northern islands. How will it 
affect China if the United States prods Japan for faster militarization and 
greater burden-sharing? How will China react to any changes in the US-Japan 
treaty relationship? How is China affected by retention, expansion or draw-
down of US forces in Japan and Korea? What are the views of China and the 
United States regarding Japan and Korea's investing in the development of 
East Siberia? What is the stake of Japan in U.S. policies toward North Korea? 
To what extent is it in the interest of China and the United States to 
champion multilateralism as an approach to the solution of all the conflicts 
in Northeast Asia? 
The future of the Korean peninsula is of particular immediate concern 
to both the United States and China. North Korea's nuclear program 
threatens regional stability and global war. The United States proposes 
punitive measures (sanctions, possibly a preemptive strike) to coerce North 
Korea into complying with the Non-proliferation Treaty. China, Japan and 
South Korea want to avoid a war at all costs and stand for a procedure of 
patient negotiations. Their major interest is in trying to solve the whole 
gamut of North Korea's problems, not just its nuclear development. The 
United States recognizes the importance of China in the on-going diplomacy . 










power in the Security Council of the United Nations which would thwart any 
American effort to take hostile group action without China's approval. The 
long range problem of Korean unification by peaceful means is of extreme 
importance to both the United States and China. No American policy toward 
North Korea has any chance of success without Chinese concurrence. 
Americans and Chinese also face situations in Southeast Asia that call 
for mutual understanding. Vietnam leaps to mind. The Chinese botched 
their pedagogical war in 1979. Failing to teach the Vietnamese a lesson, the 
Chinese have struggled ever since to mend their diplomatic fences. Can 
China and the United States keep in step in dealing with a changing 
Vietnam? Can they avoid misunderstandings in their relations with 
ASEAN? Will they split over the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia? How far can 
the United States, without its bases in the Philippines go in opposing China 
in the Spratlys? What interests of the United States will be involved if 
quarrels occur between any of the ASEAN states and their indigenous 
Chinese citizens? As a regional stabilizer in the balance of power, is there a 
qualitative difference in obligations that should be assumed by the United 
States toward allies and toward non-aligned? How can the United States 
avoid being caught in the middle in arguments between China and other 3rd 
world countries in Southeast Asia in their competition for funds and favors 
from international financial institutions? 
In dealing directly with China, American officials will find the freedom 
of thought factor is at once a handicap and an advantage. Eventually any 
official policy must be accepted by the American people, and "the people" 
have a vast array of divergent opinions so far as China is concerned. In China 
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must contend with internal dissenters, with the Congress, and with a 
heterogeneous collection of academics, business men and journalists. All are 
entitled to speak their piece. Sincere and knowledgeable persons are at 
opposite poles in interpreting what they see as happening in China. Some 
praise China for its economic reform, others want nothing to do with a China 
that is ruled by "heartless, aging butchers" or some such epithet. The job of 
the policy-maker is to arrive at some consensus in defining the national 
interest. 
The best analysis of the current national interest of the United States in 
China that I have found is in a policy paper, dated February, 1993, published 
jointly by the Atlantic Council of the United States and the National 
Committee on United States-China Relations .3 According to this document, 
the national interest can conveniently be divided into global, regional and 
bilateral segments. The global interests are China's cooperation in the United 
Nations Security Council, avoiding a hostile military posture in Asia and 
beyond, maintaining cooperation in environmental protection, assisting 
Beijing in inhibiting an internationally significant flow of migrants from 
China, and encouraging more restraint on the part of China in the domain of 
weapons proliferation (especially nuclear and chemical) and technology 
transfer (especially missiles). 
The major regional interests of the United States are to work with 
China to resolve existing conflicts or prevent further conflicts in specific 
trouble spots. wherever China touches Russia and the succession states, it is 
everybody's interest to assist Russia to rise above its own difficulties and join 
3 Barber B. Conable, Jr. and John C. Whitehead, Co-Chairs; and David M. Lampton and Alfred 










hostilities to a region of peace and development. In Korea, the international 
challenge is to persuade North Korea to resume fully its commitment to 
nuclear non-proliferation and to press on toward peaceful unification. In 
Cambodia, it is critical to keep China in line in support of the on-going 
United Nations peace-keeping process. In the subcontinent of South Asia, it 
is in the American interest if China continues its warm relations with 
Pakistan without further transfers of missiles and nuclear technology, and at 
the same time mends its fences with India. In Southeast Asia, the most 
important task for the United States is to cooperate with ASEAN and to 
maintain sufficient presence in the area to check and balance the growing 
power of China and Japan. 
All the bilateral and individual interests of the United States in China 
can be defined as jobs, concern for human rights, and security. In order to 
benefit the American job market, the United States must put its own house in 
order and become more actively engaged with the most rapidly growing 
major economy in the world today-- the increasingly active economies of 
China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. With regard to human rights, the issue is so 
overpowering that many Americans would shun all further efforts to 
improve relations with the Chinese until they agree to abandon their well-
catalogued repressive practices. The problem for the policy-maker is to find 
an acceptable balance between the demands of morality and the requirements 
of the national interest. 
The security aspect of the national interest is difficult to delimit and to 
define. China's growing military strength is a source of worry, as is the 
uncertainty of China's intentions. At the very least, to achieve an 










accomplish its objectives. The United States needs to engage China in a 
security dialogue at senior military levels as well as through military 
education and other professional exchanges. 
In fashioning China policies, the Clinton team will be well advised to 
learn what lessons they can from the long line of American officials who 
have preceded them. The Americans are not newcomers on the China scene. 
The record of the United States in China, spotty at best, is as old as the 
American nation. In the heady days of Western encroachment, the 
Americans protected their rights by bold assertions of the Open Door (equality 
of commercial opportunity) and freedom of navigation. They stood for the 
territorial and administrative integrity of China as a means of thwarting the 
hegemony of any power or group of powers in East Asia. Although opposed 
to the idea of revolution in the last days of the Chinese Empire, the 
Americans eventually came around to the support of Sun Yat-sen and the 
Chinese Nationalists. There was no democracy in China, but in World War I, 
China was enrolled on the side of the powers that fought to make the safe for 
democracy. The Americans have no reason to be ashamed of their record in 
World War II or in China's civil war. 
In 1950 the United States, the former best friend of China, became 
China's worst enemy. The sympathy of the United States followed Chiang to 
Taiwan. Communist China allied itself to the Soviet Union, in opposition to 
the United States which donned the mantle of the Free World. For more 
than twenty years the antagonism between the Free World and the 
communist conspiracy dominated every phase of global relations. 
Chou En-lai and President Nixon deserve major shares of the credit for 










recast their relations in terms of geopolitics rather than social-political theory . 
On his historic trip to China, Nixon signed the Shanghai communique of 
1972 (which is still the foundation document of contemporary U.S. -China 
policy). In this communique, the U.S. side declares: "the United States 
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain 
there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States 
Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves". It is 
not easy to undo two decades of mutual vilification, so it was not until 1979 
that the two sides jointly issued a second communique that recognizes the 
People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, 
reestablishes diplomatic relations, and reaffirms the principles agreed upon in 
the earlier Shanghai communique . 
Words can affirm a change of official attitudes, but they cannot easily 
bring about a change of heart. Some Americans retained a deep respect for 
China through the dark days of estrangement. A few still in the American 
Foreign Service spent their youth in China, some as children of missionaries. 
But most who are active in China affairs now, look on the above historical 
account with sentiments more conditioned by their own particular 
experiences in the Cold War than by their personal contacts with China. 
President Reagan was a good example of those who had difficulty in 
adjusting his China policies to the fading of the cold war. He entered office 
obsessed with the "evil empire" which in his heart also embraced China. He 
was very pleased with the Taiwan Relations Act which authorized 
continuation of commercial, cultural and other relations between the people 










the United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples 
Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be 
determined by peaceful means". 
Reagan would have liked to reestablish diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan, but Beijing would have none of it. With his long standing personal 
friendship and deep concern for the well-being of the people of Taiwan, 
Reagan was eager to put on the record a third communique, August 17, 1982 
which would clarify American policy on arms sales to China. These three 
communiques in the eyes of the Chinese are not to be tampered with. This 
third communique provides that "the United States Government reiterates 
that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of 'two 
Chinas' or 'one China, on Taiwan'". The communique also states, "the 
United States Government . . . does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of 
arms sales to Taiwan; (and) its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in 
qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years 
since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and 
China; (and) it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan". 
The Cold War was still in vogue when the torch of China policy was 
passed to President Bush. Priding himself on his acquaintance with China, 
Bush was quite impatient with those whose ideas differed from his. On 
entering office, he was persuaded of the genuineness of China's efforts at 
reform. He knew that China would proceed at its own pace and would resist 
any effort on the part of the United States to pressure China toward 










of a very friendly Sino-Soviet agreement . 
The heart of the Bush policy was to continue the same objectives 
toward China that had been consistently pursued through five 
administrations. In his perception the United States has sought: 
First. to nurture a strategic relationship with China 
aimed at drawing the Chinese out of their isolation and 
encouraging their cooperation on major international 
issues .... 
Second. to encourage China to use its influence in 
the East Asian region to reduce tensions and to promote 
stability .... 
Third. to engage the Chinese in a wide variety of 
exchanges and other activities that will bolster political 
and economic reforms and the promotion of human 
rights .... 
Fourth. to increase economic and commercial 
relations with China, so as to advance the movement 
toward a market-oriented economy.4 
The appalling tragedy of Tienanmen Square forced the president, just 
five months after his inauguration (June 5, 1989), to reassess his China policy. 
He condemned the crackdown at Tienanmen in no uncertain terms and 
indicated to the Chinese that there would be no "business as usual". He 
ordered a suspension of all visits between military leaders of the two 
countries and of government sales and commercial exports of weapons. In 
addition he announced that he would review sympathetically all requests by 
Chinese students in the United States to extend their stay. Later he ordered 
the suspension of high-level exchanges of government officials with China 
and sought successfully to postpone consideration of all new loans to China 
by international financial institutions. The challenge was to make clear 
4 This statement of the Bush objectives was presented by Acting Secretary Lawrence S. 










express it is such a way that would maintain, to the extent possible, American 
ability to influence events within China and encourage a return of reforms of 
the economy and society. 
For the remainder of the Bush administration, the course of U.S.-
China relations was largely determined by spectacular events in Europe and 
the Middle East. Uppermost in the president's mind was how to make the 
most out of the collapse of communism in Europe and construct a coalition 
of allies to stop the aggression of Saddam Hussein. While voices of outrage 
in the United States called for even sterner sanctions against China, President 
Bush focused on the need to keep China' s support in the Gulf War. Since a 
Chinese veto would have thwarted the whole American initiative in the 
Security Council of the United Nations, Chinese acquiescence was worth 
significant accommodations from the American side. Further, the president 
was mindful of the fact that at least the understanding of China would be 
essential if he were to be able eventually to establish America's leadership in 
the world and accomplish a new world order . 
In China, Bush was accused of following a dual track policy--
sometimes the carrot and sometimes the stick. In view of the conflicts of 
interest, and the ambivalence of attitudes, it had to be that way. Neither side 
would abandon its fundamental position on human rights, trade or security, 
but both sides made modest concessions for the sake of improving their 
relations. The Chinese on their side released hundreds of detainees from 
prison, re-instituted cultural and educational exchange programs, stopped 
jamming the Voice of America, admitted Peace Corps Volunteers, and 
tolerated easier contacts between their own citizens and foreign visitors and 










other intellectual property. They negotiated purchase contracts that helped 
the American balance of trade. 
The American, on their side, relaxed some of the restrictions that had 
been placed on American exports, reestablished the U.S. Joint Trade 
Commission, resumed sales of some weaponry and military equipment, and 
again authorized visits of high level civil and military officials to China. The 
American tourist trade picked up substantially with the recovery of at least 
some of the good will that had been lost a Tienanmen. 
When President Bush left office, his security policies were in process of 
revision due primarily to the diminution of the Communist threat and the 
huge budget deficit. A Department of Defense Report paid little attention to 
relations with China.s It credited the American alliance system (with Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and Philippines) as being perhaps the 
nation' s most significant achievement since the end of the Second World 
War. It said, "This system of alliances and friendship (emphasis added) 
constitutes a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented 'zone of peace' 
that encompasses more than two thirds of the world's economy". 
That Report affirmed that " it is in the interest of the United States to 
maintain a forward-deployed military presence in East Asia". Although the 
United States remains committed to the security of its friends and allies, it 
said nothing about the stability and prosperity of the others who live in the 
Pacific Rim. So far as China is concerned, it merely stated, "China continues 
to play an important role in the regional balance of power . . . A stable U. S.-
China relationship is an important element in the regional equilibrium". It 










strong and beneficial unofficial relations" . 
In the Report, China was listed as one of the five remaining 
Communist regimes in the world, facing the reality of Communism's 
economic and political failure. "These regimes will change", said the Report, 
''but the process will without doubt be volatile as Deng Xiaoping and the 
current octogenarian leaders pass from the scene". China was at best treated 
with skepticism and mistrust, and basically looked upon as a latent 
Communist threat. 
As a final indication that the United States would do as it pleased--
whatever the reaction of China-- President Bush authorized the sale of 
150 F-16s to Taiwan. That action sent a chill to Beijing and left the Chinese in 
a sullen and bitter mood which was not a very auspicious scene-setter for the 
Clinton Administration . 
v 
Issues in U.S.-China Relations 
In spite of, or perhaps because of, the fundamental changes taking place 
within China, the Clinton administration showed itself to be extremely 
cautious in making any adjustments in American policy. Overwhelmed by 
its own domestic economic and spiritual problems, and by its dilemmas in 
Iraq, Russia, Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti, the new Democratic team felt no 
compulsion for any quick changes in direction regarding China. No war 
clouds hung over the East Asia-Pacific region and no crises were impending. 
Nevertheless, old problems would not go away. The existing situation of 










miscalculations in sizing each other up. Chinese have consistently 
underestimated the fervor of American morality (even if the values the 
Americans preach are not always fully reflected in their own domestic and 
foreign behavior). Nor do the Chinese appreciate the intense American 
hatred of anything that can be labeled Communist. They have no conception 
of the force of idealism that drove the Americans to sacrifice their sons, 
daughters and treasure in Korea and Vietnam. The Chinese are not 
impressed by the burdens that Americans have assumed in order to preserve 
peace and order in the world. 
Many Americans do not accept the fact that the Chinese are moving 
ahead and "leaving it to history to write the formal obituary to the old 
Stalinist planned economy" (as Harry Harding phrased it). To many 
Americans the Chinese are still communists and therefore doomed to failure . 
There is no American sympathy with the repressive measures of an 
authoritarian regime. While Americans see democracy or some kind of · 
political plurality as a universal goal to be desired, the Chinese see it only as a 
threat to party rule and an invitation to chaos. There is no way the 
Americans can negotiate the Chinese into accepting democracy as an objective 
of political reform . 
The Chinese are too quick to prophesy the decline of American power, 
and the Americans are too slow in recognizing the speed and extent of 
Chinese growth. By any standard China today is a great power, not the 
hapless giant it was before the coming of the Communists. The stronger 
China becomes, the less pliable it becomes. The Chinese can be just as 










strength and justice in each others' negotiating positions . 
When the Americans address upcoming issues, they insist upon 
regional security at an acceptable price, a fairer playing field in trade, and an 
opportunity to encourage the Chinese to move closer toward a free market, a 
participatory government, and an acceptance of international standards of 
human rights. On their part the Chinese will stress state sovereignty, the 
right to run their own internal affairs, agreement from the United States to 
grant them broader access to the American market, and greater trading favors 
to the 3rd world. 
If some of the issues prove insoluble, the passion of the arguments can 
at least be reduced. Attitudes on both sides of the bargaining table can be 
improved. The achieving of agreement is a long patient process. 
Breakthroughs are not going to be accomplished overnight. To paraphrase 
Chou En-lai, "a journey of 10,000 li must be made one step at a time" . On the 
other hand, as the negotiations continue there will be ample opportunity for 
something resembling old fashioned horse-trading -- for example support for 
entry into GATT in exchange for further restraint on missile sales. The 
bargaining process may not be that open, or that crude, but the net result will 
be precisely the same . 
The first group of issues between China and the United States deals 
with security. China and the United States are not dangerously far apart on 
nuclear matters. Both are tremendously relieved by the end of the U.S.-
Soviet nuclear confrontation and supportive of the various moves toward 
progressive nuclear disarmament. Both are on record as opposing nuclear 
proliferation. In current reckoning, 15 to 20 nations may have the ability to 










like the other 7, accepts the goal of non-proliferation and devises strategies 
and interprets treaty obligations to its own advantage. China honors the 
establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones and has long advocated 
reduction of stock piles to a common level and a "no first use" agreement. As 
has already been pointed out, China has agreed to observe the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty, the Missiles Technology Control Regime and the Draft 
Convention on Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons. 
Beijing's policies with respect to nuclear and missile proliferation 
remain matters of serious concern to the United States. The Chinese say they 
will follow international agreements but their heart is not in it. They 
complain that since they were not consulted when these documents were 
drawn up, they have different views of their obligations. Since the United 
States sells to whomever it pleases, China wants the same rights. China has 
aided the nuclear programs of 40 countries including Iraq, Algeria, Iran, 
Pakistan and Brazil. It has transferred missile technology to Pakistan, Syria, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is the fourth largest weapons seller in the world 
behind the United States, Russia and France. Iraq owes China hundreds of 
millions of dollars for arms already purchased while Iran is primarily 
dependent on China for the current build up of its defense industries. China 
does not look upon its sales and transfers as any more destabilizing than 
those of its competitors . 
The United States and China have differences in other matters of arms 
control. In defining its policies on arms control, the United States promises 
to avoid introduction of new types of equipment that: a) substantially increase 










races or create destabilizing military imbalances. The United States considers 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles transfers as 
inherently destabilizing. It particularly wants limitation on such transfers to 
the Middle East. These policies are interpreted by China to be efforts to set the 
agenda or to exert a dominant influence in multilateral discussions. They are 
resented by China, whose representatives have their own principles and 
priorities. The Chinese see arms control as an important part, but only a part, 
of the ultimate objective of peace and security in their region and in the 
whole world. 
Speaking at a regional disarmament conference in Shanghai in August, 
1992, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen laid down his own prescription for peace 
and mutual security in East Asia. According to him, everyone should abide 
by the UN charter and the Five Principles of Coexistence. All acts of 
hegemonism, aggression and expansion should be opposed and prevented. 
There should be no more foreign bases or foreign-based troops abroad. 
Disputes should be settled peacefully and confidence-building measures 
should be multiplied. Arms races should be brought to an end and military 
confrontation should give way to economic cooperation. 
It is further difficult to reach an understanding with Chinese on 
military matters because of the secrecy and complexity of their methods of 
military production and sales. Many defense industries depend upon 
manufacture of civilian goods to keep their heads above water. The same 
state-supported companies that make guns, missiles, tanks, trucks and 
personnel-carriers also make such civilian goods as minivans, refrigerators, 
machine tools, motorcycles and food blenders. More than 700,000 soldiers 










Polytechnologies is the name given to the export arm of the General Staff. It 
is also one of many operating companies in CITIC (China International Trust 
and Investment Corporation) which is one of the world' s giant 
conglomerates. So many of these military-civilian state enterprises are 
dominated by the "princes". At one time, the president of CITIC was the son-
in-law of Deng Xiaoping; the vice president was the daughter of Yang 
Shangkun, and the PLA overseer was the son of He Long. The powerful 
Commission for Science, Industry and Technology was headed by the son-in-
law of the late Marshal Nie Rongzhen. 
The most difficult security issues involving a third party in current US-
China relations are still those left over from the Cold-War. With respect to 
issues involving Russia, the United States is most concerned about the 
disposition of missiles and nuclear weapons that might surreptitiously find 
their way into China. No less disturbing is China's acquisition of quantities of 
offensive weapons and sophisticated military equipment from Russia. The 
arsenal of Kazakstan is of particular concern, as are centrifugal trends that 
have appeared in parts of East Siberia. Significant numbers of Chinese have 
migrated to Siberia, while Chinese conduct the major portion of the 
flourishing trade across the Manchuria-Siberia border . 
Sometime in the future, China might be tempted to play its Russia card 
as a counter to the US-Japan treaty relationship. So far, China has viewed the 
US-Japan connection as a net benefit. China is haunted by the fear of a 
remilitarized Japan. An economically strong Japan is welcome for its 
investments, its aid and its managerial talent, but an ultra-nationalistic 
independently rearmed Japan is anathema. China resents such statements as 










object to the US-Japan alliance as long as it does not get any stronger. As long 
as Japan is tied to the United States, Japan is not likely again "to roll like the 
hot sun over the mainland of Asia". The nations of Southeast Asia share this 
sentiment. 
It is not China but the United States which is more concerned lest 
China policy toward Taiwan might disturb the peace. The situation in the 
Taiwan Strait is basically peaceful, and the relationship between Beijing and 
Taipei is improving with increasing trade and tourism. Periodic incidents, 
giving rise to hot tempers and strongly worded protests, cannot escape 
American attention. Nevertheless, US policy remains as defined in the 
Taiwan Relations Act and the Three Communiques. But as former Secretary 
of Defense Cheney cautioned, "In keeping with this policy, we will sustain 
our efforts to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability" . 
The Americans have tried in vain to get China to commit itself to a peaceful 
solution of the Taiwanese question, but to the Chinese, Taiwan is strictly a 
domestic issue. It is no business of the United States. An outspoken official 
has gone so far to say, 'We will stop the independence of Taiwan, even at the 
cost of blood". China will overlook a great deal of opposition talk from 
Taiwan, but the one thing that China will not tolerate is an outright Taiwan 
declaration of independence. 
The United States and China have conflicts of interests in Southeast 
Asia that require constant attention. I do not think that American influence 
in that part of the world has diminished to any great extent by the departure 
of units of the air force from Clark Field and the navy from Subic Bay. The 
Americans regarded those bases as symbols of power, but they were also 










most of the nations in Southeast Asia; and navy units on constant patrol are 
adequate symbols of the American presence. 
While the American interest in Southeast Asia has been reduced, 
Chinese activity has increased by leaps and bounds. China has the advantage 
of geographic proximity and the substantial number of overseas residents in 
Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines. With its interest in the 
Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk, China is a substantial player in Cambodia. It 
has taken unusual initiatives in Burma. In support of the ruling junta it has 
sold substantial amounts of military weapons and equipment on 
concessionary terms. It is constructing roads that lead across country to the 
naval base in Bassein. It is in process of mending its fences with its 
immediate neighbor, Vietnam. Such moves as these must be taken into 
account by Americans in negotiating security issues with China . 
In American opinion, it is China and Vietnam that continue to be 
most likely to engage in armed conflict over the Spratlys. China denies any 
aggressive intent in the buildup of its military and in its activities in the 
South China Seas, but the United States is not convinced. It is irritating to see 
a formidable new power operating in a sub-region where its own navy has 
been unchallenged in peace time for nearly a century . 
In all the details of security issues between the United States and China, 
the bottom line is that their common interests far outweigh their conflicts. 
Both nations share a common goal of peace, stability and progress. The 
United States shares China' s contention that although they have diverging 
security interests that must be safeguarded, but they have no disputes that are 
worth the risk of war. Both will benefit from less talk and more negotiation, 










between China and the United States has grown by leaps and bounds. By 
Chinese figures it reached nearly US$ 13 billion in 1993; by American customs 
statistics it was $32 billion. The difference is that the Americans include 
reexports from Hong Kong as Chinese. The Chinese call this accounting 
process unreasonable. The United States is China's third largest market while 
China is the sixth largest supplier of American imports. China sells the 
United States textiles, garments, toys and games, electrical appliances, 
electronic materials, shoes, ceramics and plastics (much of which the United 
States formerly bought from Japan, Taiwan or South Korea) . China ranks 
fifteenth among the customers of the United States. The United States sells to 
China (either directly or through Hong Kong) aircraft, autos, 
telecommunications equipment, computers, farm products, machine tools, 
fertilizers, chemicals and oil-drilling machinery . 
Americans are unhappy about the negative balance of trade. By 
counting the American way, the negative balance exceeded US$ 23 billion in 
1993, the greatest with any country except Japan. Although it is easy to see 
that exports mean jobs (150,000 in 1993), it is often overlooked that imports 
also means jobs and profits. Imports from China are usually cheap, thus 
giving the American consumer a price benefit. Many retail stores and small 
manufacturing units in the United States depend on their Chinese suppliers. 
A very large proportion of goods "Made in China" are actually made in 
American-owned factories located in China, so a large share of the profits is 
routinely repatriated. 
Hong Kong, China and the United States must be considered together 
as parts of the U.S.-China economics and trade issue. Although integration of 










all foreign investments in China and China has between US$ 10 and 15 
billion invested Hong Kong. Hong Kong accounts for 80% of the 
manufacturing in Guandong province where 3,000,000 Chinese work in Hong 
Kong-owned factories. Some 22,000 Americans live in Hong Kong. They 
look after US$ 7 billion in American investments, representing 900 
companies employing 200,000 workers or 1/10 of the Hong Kong work force. 
Any sanctions considered against China must take into account effects on the 
American interests in Hong Kong. 
At the beginning of 1993 American investments in mainland China 
were estimated US$ 2.7 billion in some 1700 joint ventures. More than 500 
banks and corporations had offices in China. The neon signs on China' s 
streets ranged all the way from Boeing, General Motors, IBM, Xerox, DuPont, 
Chrysler, Motorola and United Technologies to Kentucky Fried Chicken, 
Pepsi, Coca Cola and McDonalds. In the meantime various Chinese (not 
Taiwan or Hong Kong) investors were credited with investing some US$ 430 
million in 225 trading enterprises and 153 non-trading enterprises in the 
United States. The Chinese interests included iron and steel and forest 
exploitation projects, an oil refinery in California and a fertilizer plant in 
Florida . 
The course of ordinary international trade is never without 
misunderstandings . When different systems-- capitalist and socialist-- are 
involved, and when the principals are as culturally different as Americans 
and Chinese, the complaints are bound to be noisy and the arguments hot. 
The Americans insist on fair trade, a level playing field, and a "transparent" 
trading system. Profitable trade depends upon published rules and 










traders in China are echoes of the 19th century when merchants fought for 
extra territoriality, and for a fixed and published schedule of tariffs and transit 
taxes. 
The crucial period for both Chinese and Americans in confronting the 
issue of trade carne after the end of the Gulf War. The ill will of the 
Tienanrnen incident was subsiding, the trade figures were climbing steadily, 
so the time was ripe for both China and United States to address their 
differences. The Chinese were concerned that the Americans might cut off 
Most Favored Nation treatment or slap prohibitive duties on Chinese goods 
under terms of Section 301 or the U.S. Trade Act of 1988. The Americans felt 
the time was ripe to press for elimination of some trade abuses, wider access 
to the China market, and improvement of the trade imbalance. 
Year-long negotiations were undertaken late in 1991 which led 
eventually to a more harmonious relationship, substantial new contracts for 
purchases of American goods, and resumption of the activities of the U.S.-
China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade. In separate memoranda 
resulting from the negotiations, the Chinese agreed to protect intellectual 
property rights covering copyrights, patents and trademarks; to ban the export 
of goods produced in "reform-through-labor" (prison) camps; and to end 
within two years most of the annoying irregular practices that had made the 
traders' life miserable. Specifically, the Chinese agreed to publish all laws, 
regulations and policies on trade; to lift import controls and licensing 
requirements, and to remove a parcel of unreasonable trade barriers. These 
agreements represented gains for both sides. The Americans were pleased 
with the improvements in the trading system, which they also regarded as 










MFN and Section 301. They also hoped to soften the Americans in 
permitting the export of more high tech equipment and to win American 
support for the Chinese application for reentry to GATT. 
The most baffling problem of trade centered about the granting of Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) status to China. The issue had to be considered 
annually under the terms of the Jackson-Vanick amendment to the export 
trade law which became effective in 1979. Some Americans held that 
granting MFN implied moral or political approval and therefore should be 
withheld from China. They believed that ''between toys and torture, the 
choice is clear". They called for elimination of credits to China, no 
government insurance for business operations, no tariff breaks for the 
Chinese, and strict control of high tech exports to China. They argued that 
MFN would bring further profits to violators of human rights and should be 
withheld until the repressive Chinese government mends its ways. 
Other Americans argued that MFN should in no way be linked to 
morality because it was no more than the age-old guarantee of indiscriminate 
treatment in international trade. According to them, MFN is good for China 
and it is good for the United States. Trade was seen to be the engine driving 
economic reform in China, and if trade were to fall off, all hope for political 
reform would evaporate. What was at stake in the MFN debate was not only 
benefit to China, but to Americans in Hong Kong, and to Americans within 
the United States who make their living in the China trade. Their argument 
held that trade had opened new avenues to wealth in China, thereby 
contributing immensely to a new middle class. The odds are that those who 










for more political freedom (the right to enjoy the fruits of their labor) . 
Further on the practical side, this second school of thought insisted that 
American revocation of MFN would work to the advantage of Japanese and 
Europeans who were all too ready to take advantage of any opportunity to 
plunge deeper into the burgeoning China market. If MFN were to be 
revoked, or limited by conditions considered unbearable by China, it was not 
inconceivable that China would retaliate by taking an uncooperative attitude 
against the United States in the Security Council of the United Nations, in 
arms control discussions, or in conferences on regional problems including 
the Middle East. 
The stark fact that emerged after fruitless negotiations was that MFN 
would have to be extended to China, or a disastrous trade war would erupt. It 
was also a matter of principle in American policy that MFN and the third set 
of issues between the United States and China -- the issue of human rights 
-- should be linked together. Either the Chinese would make progress in the 
observation of human rights or they would not be granted the "privilege" of 
MFN. The Chinese opposed the linkage. For one thing, it recalled the bad old 
days of extraterritoriality; for another, it denied China's right to absolute 
sovereignty. The Chinese contended that American action after Tienanmen 
was high handed and unjustified from an international point of view. 
To the Americans freedom, democracy, human rights and a free 
market are inseparable and any one of these values can be taken as a symbol 
for all four. Since human rights were perceived as those enshrined in the 
Constitution, it was taken for granted that this perception could be accepted as 
a universal. The United States informed China that it would like to see in 










minority groups. On the positive side it wanted China to implement a 
system of justice based on a rule of law, to liberalize its state security system, 
and to guarantee such individual freedoms as the rights of free speech, 
assembly and the right to travel. In particular, the United States alleged that 
after Tienanmen over a thousand death sentences were decreed and more 
than half were carried out. Americans were appalled by the "genocide" of 
Tibet and the continued imprisonment of thousands of prisoners of 
conscience. 
The Chinese denied the truth of some of these allegations. For 
example, they said they "have established the basic principle of equality, 
solidarity, and common prosperity" among all the 55 minority nationalities 
in China. They denied any genocide in Tibet, boasting that they abolished 
serfdom, improved the standard of living, and lengthened the life span of 
Tibetans from 35 years in 1950 to 65 years in 1990. As for Tibetan claims to 
independence, the Chinese responded that sovereignty over Tibet has 
belonged to China since the Yuan dynasty. One Chinese asserted, "China's 
claims to Tibet are far more solid than America's claims to Texas and 
California" . 
As for charges of abuse of human rights, as defined by the Americans, 
the Chinese feel no sense of guilt. They have their own perception of human 
rights. To them, the right to subsistence and to develop according to their 
own historical background, cultural traditions, ideology, social and economic 
system are first and fundamental. As they say, " the hungry cannot talk about 
freedom and the chanting of democracy cannot give the people their rights of 
subsistence and development". To the Chinese there cannot be a unified 










and the security of the state are endangered by acts of the individual-- as they 
were at Tienanmen -- the individual must be punished. The severity of the 
punishment is to be adjudged by the Chinese alone. Who is executed, or 
imprisoned without trial, is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. Any 
meddling from the outside must be regarded as interference in internal 
affairs. 
Given the difference in approach to human rights, the United States 
faced a basic challenge-- in what manner and to what extent can the United 
States most effectively influence China towards a better observance of human 
rights as perceived and defined by the United States? Fundamentally, the 
United States was in no position to make demands on China. Both are 
sovereign states and neither is in any way accountable to the other. The 
United States could express its desires, or lay down its conditions for granting 
MFN, but it was impossible to make demands. 
As long as Republicans occupied the White House, American policy 
was that more could be accomplished in human rights by relying upon 
private conversations rather than official arguments. It was assumed that 
economic reform would gradually lead toward political reform. At first, 
President Clinton took a harder line. In May, 1993 he issued an Executive 
Order that China's MFN status would be renewed only if Beijing made 
"significant overall progress on human rights" . Two requirements were 
mandatory: cooperation on ending the export of prison-made goods to the 
United States and allowing close family members of certain dissidents to 
leave the country. In five other areas, progress would have to be made: 
taking steps to begin adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 










(like the Red Cross); protecting Tibet's religious and cultural heritage; and 
permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China. 
On May 26, 1994 President Clinton bowed to the importance of China 
in American security and economic interests and announced that MFN and 
human rights would be delinked. Acknowledging that China had fallen 
short of "overall significant progress in human rights", as specified in his 
Executive Order, he nevertheless renewed MFN as the best means of 
advancing all our interests in China. At the same time he extended the 
sanctions imposed by President Bush after Tienanmen and banned the 
import of guns and ammunition from China. He also announced a new and 
vigorous program to support those in China working to advance the cause of 
human rights and democracy. This program would include increased 
broadcasts for Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America, increased support 
for nongovernmental organizations working on human rights in China, and 
the developments with American business leaders of a voluntary set of 
principles for business activity in China . 
VI 
Toward Better U.S.-China Relations 
This study of the United States and China as the major cause of the 
malaise in the East Asia and Pacific Region concludes with suggestions 
intended to contribute to better U.S.-China relations and to the making of 
more effective American policies. At the outset let me add my hearty 
endorsement to the recommendations listed in the State Department 










We can and should: 
Reemphasize our shared interests with the Asia-
Pacific region in economic prosperity and peace, 
rekindling the positive aspects of the historic 
Seattle conclave .... 
Temper our rhetoric and work with the Congress to 
reduce expectations about quick fixes to what are 
often structural problems. 
Oppose or readjust proposals from other agencies, 
often pursued for domestic reasons, when we are 
convinced that they will prove ineffective or 
counterproductive. 
Weigh more carefully the costs/benefits of taking 
unilateral actions. Consider multilateral 
al terna ti ves. 
Define more effective means to advance global 
agenda issues in an Asian context which 
emphasizes gradualism and consensus. 
Generally, we must pay greater attention to our style. While Asians 
want us engaged, they are increasingly conscious and proud of their 
accomplishments, in contrast to trends in other regions. Their growing 
prosperity and power require that our relations be seen as founded on 
equality. We need a sophisticated diplomacy that is better calibrated to the 
changing Asian environment.6 
China is no longer, if it ever was, a pawn in a Communist conspiracy to 
rule the world. It is no longer, if it ever was, an economic basket case. 
Chinese leaders are confident of the correctness of their modernization 
program. The Chinese economic goal of "socialism, with Chinese 
characteristics" is not antagonistic to "capitalism, with American 
characteristics". China's path of political development-- dubbed the four 










appropriate in China. Values and institutions may be vastly different, but the 
two nations can coexist in peace. 
In its relations with China, the United States must recognize the fact 
that China is strong and growing, and is entitled to be treated as a great power . 
We have learned that it is counter productive to use trade measures to 
achieve non trade objectives. It is unwise to lecture, to moralize or to preach. 
Although the present diplomatic atmosphere is slightly strained, it is in the 
interest of both nations to work for improvement. Contacts should be 
expanded at every level -- political, cultural, commercial and military. 
Whether it is to keep China from using its veto power in the U.N. Security 
Council or to court China's good will in dealing with the Third World or the 
threat of nuclear proliferation in North Korea, the cooperation of China is 
worth nurturing. If there is a lesson to be learned in the ineffectiveness of 
sanctions imposed on China after Tienanmen, it is that China cannot be 
bullied or intimidated by a get tough policy. 
If the ultimate goal of the United States is to maintain its total 
influence in East Asia and the Pacific, it is wrong to divide the region into 
"friends and allies" on the one hand, and to distinguish "friends and allies" 
from all the others. This is a hangover from the cold war. The Strategic 
Framework for the Pacific Rim states, "we are in the process of building more 
mature and more reciprocal economic and defense partnerships with our 
allies and friends (emphasis added) to meet the demands of a new era and 
shape the emerging security environment". Query: what are "we" doing 
with the others, primarily China? Why have separate scenarios for "friends 
and allies" and for "the others"? "Allies" are not permanent, neither are 
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Greater China with the addition of Hong Kong and possibly Taiwan, it will be 
all the more advantageous to treat China as a friend. 
A final reminder is that the future of U.S.-China relations affects the 
entire East Asia-Pacific region. The old Dulles collective defense system 
served the United States adequately during the Cold War but it is time for 
agonizing reappraisals. The interests of the United States have been protected 
by a series of bilateral treaties -- the United States and Japan, the United States 
and Korea, the United States and the Philippines, the Southeast Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty, and the United States and Australia and New 
Zealand -- but it may be that the time has come to consider broader and more 
balanced arrangements. Not wanting to be a mere client of a military patron 
any longer, every nation wants a relationship based on equality and 
reciprocity and more attuned to mutual economic cooperation than to 
mutual security. As diplomatic maneuvering proceeds, China does not want 
to be left out of the loop. 
Since no one nation, not even the United States, has any prospect of 
dominating the region, every power great and small has a stake in the 
settlement of such trans-national issues as drugs, AIDS, refugees, arms 
control, nuclear explosions and protection of the environment. In the past, 
East Asia has been the battleground for the Great Powers. In spite of recent 
memories of Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia, the region for the foreseeable 
future is fundamentally stable and prosperous. The United States will be a 
leader in keeping it that way, but in adjusting its relations with "allies and 
friends" it will be well advised to invite China to join in the game. With 
good working relations with all its neighbors, and with its growing power and 










Subject: Challenges of U.S. Foreign Policy in East Asia-Pacific Region. 
Attributed to Assistant Secretary: Winston E. Lord . 
The Malaise 
This spring, the positive Pacific Community principles articulated by 
the President in Seattle are being crowded out by a plethora of problems 
which Asians perceive as caused by hostile unilateral U. S. actions. These are 
creating a sense of resentment and apprehension in our relations with the 
region -- and also engendering some tension within the Administration . 
Central to this malaise are the problems in our two principal Asian 
relationships --Japan and China. We view these as arising from the 
unwillingness of Japan and China to conform their policies to international 
norms. Asians, and others view us as placating domestic interest groups and 
criticize us for tactics that destabilize relationships which are central to the 
region's peace and prosperity. 
There are a host of other frictions. Our attempt to interject workers 
rights issues into the World Trade Organization has been universally 
opposed by Asians and non-Asians alike (France being the major exception); 
it threatens to mar the APEC trade ministers meeting in Marrakesh. We 
have sanctioned China on the MTCR, and Thailand for Libya. We just 
announced sanctions on Taiwan regarding endangered species. We have 
decertified Laos on narcotics, although granting them a national interest 
waiver softened the blow. We continue to press Malaysia and Indonesia on 
workers rights and Singapore on its flogging sentence against an American 
teenager. We disagree with almost all Asians about the proper tactics for 
promoting reform in Burma. In varying degrees, our promotion of human 
rights and democracy complicates our ties with several nations . 
This is not to suggest that such policies are basically wrong. We have a 
right and a duty to pursue our interests and reflect our values. Moreover, 
one should not judge success by an absence of friction; harmony sometimes is 
purchased by papering over differences, risking larger problems down the 
road. Some of the frictions can be viewed as inevitable bumps in the road. 
The confluence of these individual issues, however, has fostered malaise, 
eroding the sense of optimism and partnership forged in Seattle. 
In brie( the Asia-Pacific region presents in acute form a general 
challenge for American foreign policy: how do we reconcile our competing 












The way we are seeking some goals entails costs in our bilateral 
relations. Beyond that are the risks to our broader regional interests. These 
include: 
An increasing gap between the President's vision of a Pacific 
community and the reality of some bilateral dealings. 
Weakened US influence in APEC; lost opportunities for 
partnership, business and growth in Asia; the prospect of an 
essentially damage-control agenda for the President in Bali . 
Less Asian receptivity to US views in the regional security 
dialogues you will be inaugurating at the ASEAN Regional 
Forum . 
Fuel for Mahathir's concept of an EAEC excluding the United 
States; resonance for Mahathir, the Chinese and others who 
charge we are seeking to dominate Asia. 
There are some disturbing straws in the wind: Hosokawa's 
undercutting of us on human rights during his China visit. Kim's softer 
pitch in Beijing on the nuclear issue. Evans playing up of our trade disputes 
with China and Japan. Romulo's criticism of our Korean policy. The 
Bangkok meeting last spring which sought to counter the universality of 
human rights. Increased soundings of these themes in Asian and American 
circles. 
All of this is played out against the backdrop of dwindling resources in 
personnel, overseas posts, and aid levels for this priority region . 
Balancing Interests 
A common thread is the question of how we pursue global agenda 
issues in our bilateral relations. In most instances, we have sought to use 
trade measures to achieve non-trade objectives . 
I have long advocated the importance of raising the profile of 
transnational issues in our foreign policy. Indeed, I chaired the Carnegie 
Commission Report which underlined this theme, served as chairman of the 
National Endowment for Democracy and Vice Chairman of the International 










interests into the fabric of our relations in Asia. I have counseled my bureau 
and our posts to resist parochial impulses and keep in mind our broader 
national objectives. 
At the same time, we must weigh the impact of pursuing specific short-
term goals on our overall long-term interests in East Asia and the Pacific. 
These include tapping Asia's huge economic potential and shaping a sense of 
community that will anchor us in the region and foster peace and prosperity. 
In the long run, our broad economic, security and democratization 
goals are mutually reinforcing. But there will be times when trade-offs are 
required between competing short term objectives. We need to look 
creatively for policies that advance various interests simultaneously, though 
at times we will need to set clear priorities. Our recent successful effort to 
define ways of promoting human rights in Indonesia while furthering our 
economic and security interests shows this can be done . 
Policy Guides 
How can we address the malaise? 
First of all, we retain considerable assets for influence in the region: 
The near universal Asian-Pacific desire for a continuing American security 
presence to maintain stability and balance between historic rivals and 
potential antagonists. Our large market for Asian exports and our 
capital/technology for investment. The overall trend toward more open 
societies from Mongolia to South Korea to Taiwan to Cambodia. A fifty year 
legacy of good will among many Asians. 
Upon such foundations we can and should: 
Reemphasize our shared interests with the Asia-Pacific region in 
economic prosperity and peace, rekindling the positive aspects of the 
historic Seattle conclave. The remainder of 1994 offers good 
opportunities: The US-ASEAN Dialogue and the regional security 
meeting in May, the ASEAN-PMC and ARF ministerial in July and the 
APEC ministerial and leaders meetings this fall. 
Temper our rhetoric and work with the Congress to reduce 
expectations about quick fixes to what are often structural problems. 
Oppose or readjust proposals from other agencies, often pursued for 










Weigh more carefully the costs-benefits of taking unilateral actions. 
Consider multilateral alternatives . 
Define more effective means to advance global agenda issues in an 
Asian context which emphasizes gradualism and consensus. 
Generally, we must pay greater attention to our style. While Asians 
want us engaged, they are increasingly conscious and proud of their 
accomplishments, in contrast to trends in other regions. Their growing 
prosperity and power require that our relations be seen as founded on 
equality. We need a sophisticated diplomacy that is better calibrated to the 
changing Asian environment . 
Looking Forward 
I plan to give this strategic imperative my highest priority in coming 
months and have instructed my colleagues to do likewise. We have 
submitted a major interagency PRD study on Asian policy to the NSC which 
begins to address these questions. I have asked the intelligence community to 
assess Asian perceptions and their impact on US interests. I am convening a 
Chiefs of Mission Conference in Hawaii in June and have invited key 
seventh floor colleagues to join us -- the central themes will be those in this 
paper and the management of our dwindling resources. 
This then is a core challenge in the Asia-Pacific region for U.S. policy 
makers. We in EAP welcome the counsel and help of others-- in this 
building, at our overseas posts, elsewhere in the government, and in 
academia and think tanks. To this end, I invite comments on this paper . 
• • • • • • • • 
